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Abstract
This paper examines the direct and indirect eﬀects of a government's
wage policy in the public sector on the overall income distribution in the
economy. By direct eﬀects we mean the wage diﬀerentials in the public
sector. Indirect eﬀects refer to the secondary eﬀects of the government's
policy through changes in the occupational structure. This analysis is
based on a simple model suggested by Tinbergen (1951) and Roy (1951),
followed by Houthakker (1976). In the numerical calculations, the model
yields realistic conclusions which underline the importance of government
wage policy.
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Introduction
Government intervention in the process of wage determination takes a variety
of forms. Discussions of this question most commonly refer to statutory regu-
lation of wages (primarily concerned with establishing minimum rates and the
protection of low-paid workers), arbitration procedures, and intervention in col-
lective bargaining. The recent growth in Western economies of the public sector
relative to the private sector has shifted the focus of this discussion to the di-
rect and indirect eﬀects of wage policies in the public sector on the overall labor
market conditions and on income distribution. By direct eﬀects I mean the level
of pay by the government for diﬀerent occupations. Indirect eﬀects refer to the
secondary eﬀects, generated through changes in the occupational structure, as
induced by wage policies in the public sector.
This paper focuses on the eﬀects of government's wage policy within the
public sector on the distribution of income in the private sector, as well as on
the overall income distribution. In particuiar, by means of a very simple model
originally suggested by Tinbergen. (1951) and followed by Roy (1951) and
Houthakker (1976), it examines the eﬀects of the public sector's wage schedule
on the distribution of the labor force between sectors and on the distribution of
income.
Let us ﬁrst look at some facts concerning income diﬀerentials between the
private and public sectors in some Western economies. Smith (1976) has stud-
ied pay diﬀerences between these sectors for the US. economy. Although no
systematic diﬀerence was found for the average pay across diﬀenent comparable
occupations, there seems to be a clear negative correlation between the wage
ratio (public to private) and the level of income. From her ﬁndings one can
compute Table 1 .
Table 1:
Average Earnings of Men in Diﬀerent Occupational
Groups U.S.A 1958-1970
Percentage of average for all groups
Private sector Public Sector
Higher Professional 298 180
Lower Professional 124 154
Administrators and managers 271 160
Clerks 100 110
Foremen 149 130
Skilled manual 117 100
Semiskilled manual 85 89
Unskilled manual 79 85
It is quite clear from the table that the spread of wages is much smaller
in the public sector than in the private sector. The obvious question that this
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observation brings to mind is whether the public sector is getting lower abiiity
individuals within each occupation. If so, then there is presumably an addi-
tional eﬀect, namely, if individualis with high ability within the high-paying
occupations tend to work in the private sector and if low-ability individuals
work in the low-paying occupations, then the income distribution in the private
sector tends to be less egalitarian when the wage policy in the public sector is
more egalitarian. Some evidence for such tendency in the Israeli economy can
be deduced from the studies of Hanoch (1963) and Levy (1975).
We now turn to a simple model of the choice of work among sectors, showing
the dependence of income distribution within and between sectors on the public
sector's wage policy.
The assumptions of the model are no doubt too simple to provide a real-
istic description. Nevertheless, they have fairly realistic implications for the
distribution of income and the labor force.
A Basic Model of Labor Force Distribution
Each individual is assumed to maximize his earnings by choosing among occu-
pations according to his aptitude for each occupation. We focus on the choice
between public sector and private sector employment. Let the individual's ap-
titudes be summarized by the pair (a1, a2), where a1 is his marginal product in
the public sector, and a2 is his marginal product in the private sector. For sim-
plicity, these productivities are assumed to be independent of the labor force
allocation between the sectors. The individual's working time is assumed to
be ﬁxed at unity. The time devoted to the ith occupation is xi, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1.
The wages paid. by each sector, wi, are assumed to depend on his aptitude:
wi = wi (ai). It is thus assumed that the individuai's aptitude can be identiﬁed.
The individual is supposed to not favor any occupation and hence to altocate
his working time so as to maximize his income. Thus,
max
x1,x2
(w1x1 + w2x2) (1)
subject to
x1 + x2 = 1 (2)
The maximum is reached by working all the time in the sector for which his
wage is greatest. Normally there is only one such occupation. If there is more
than one, then the allocation of time is indeterminate.
This simple micromodel lends itself readily to aggregation over individuals,
provided suitable continuity assumptions are made. For this purpose we assume
that the pair (a1, a2) varies randomly over the individuals with a continuous
density function f (a1, a2). The distribution function F (a1, a2) is then also
continuous. To eliminate the indeterminacy mentioned earlier, only density
functions and wage schedules wi (ai) where ties (i.e. w1 = w2) have a zero
probability are considered. Otherwise, no restrictions are imposed on the joint
density function. In particuiar, aptitudes may or may not be independent of
each other.
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The (cumulative) distribution function for incomes in sector i = 1, 2, is
denoted Gi (z), and the corresponding density is denoted gi (z). The overall
distribution function is G (z) = G1 (z)+G2 (z) and the density is g (z) = g1 (z)+
g2 (z).
If wi are strictly monotone increasing functions of ai, then the basic impli-
cation of the model for the distribution of income is
G (z) = F
[
w−11 (z1) , w
−1
2 (z2)
]
(3)
where z = w1 (a1) = w2 (a2) and w
−1
i are the corresponding inverse functions.
The distribution of income in any occupation can be derived similarly. For
example,
G1 (z) =
zˆ
0
z1ˆ
0
f
[
w−11 (z1) , w
−1
2 (z2)
] 1
∆
dz1dz2 (4)
where
∆ = w
′
1
[
w−11 (z1)
]
w
′
2
[
w−12 (z2)
]
, w
′
i = dvi(ai)/dai
It is assumed throughout that the private sector pays individuals their
marginal product, that is,
w2 (a2) = a2 (5)
The analysis focuses on the impact of the wage policy in the public sector
on income distribution, labor force allocation, and output levels. To simplify, it
is conﬁned to linear wage schedules, and to bivariate exponential distributions,
selected for computational convenience, rather than realism. Then, let
w1 = α+ βa1 (6)
where α, β (β > 0) are constants. The density function of aptitudes is assumed
to have the form:1
f (a1, a2) = θˆ1θˆ2 exp
(
−θˆ1a1 − θˆ2a2
)
(7)
where θˆ1, θˆ2 (θˆ1 > 0, θˆ2 > 0) are constants. Bt Eqs. (4)-(7),
G1 (z) =θ1θ2 exp (θ1α)
zˆ
α
w1ˆ
0
exp (−θ1w1 − θ2w2) dw1dw2
= [θ1/ (θ1 + θ2)] {exp (−θ2α) exp [− (θ1 + θ2) (z − α)]− 1}
− exp [−θ1 (z − α)] + 1
(8)
1This distribution is the product of two univariate exponentials and therefore does not allow
for dependence. Bivariate exponentials with dependence have been introduced by Marshall
and Olkin (1967), but they violate this assumption that the probability of ties is zero.
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where θ1 =
(
θˆ1/β
)
, θ2 = θˆ2. Similarly,
G2 (z) =θ1θ2 exp (θ1α)
zˆ
α
w2ˆ
α
exp (−θ1w1 − θ2w2) dw1dw2
= [θ2/ (θ1 + θ2)] {exp (−θ2α) exp [− (θ1 + θ2) (z − α)]− 1}
− exp (−θ2z) + exp (−θ2α)
(9)
Adding up, we ﬁnd
G (z) = exp (−θ2α) exp [− (θ1 + θ2) (z + α)]− exp [−θ1 (z − α)]
− exp (−θ2z) + 1
= {1− exp [−θ1 (z − α)]} {1− exp {−θ2z}}
(10)
The income density within the public sector is given by
g1 (z) = θ1 exp [−θ1 (z − α)] [e− exp (−θ2z)] (11)
and in the private sector by
g2 (z) = θ2 exp (−θ2z) {1− exp [−θ1 (z − α)]} (12)
Hence, the overall income density is
g (z) =θ1 exp [−θ1 (z − α)] + θ2 exp (−θ2z)
− (θ1 + θ2) exp (−θ2α) exp [− (θ1 + θ2) (z − a)]
(13)
Notice that although. the density furiction of abilities is J-shaped for each
sector, the density of income in each sector looks much more like the income
distributions encountered in reality (see Figure 1 and Lydall 1968).
Suppose now that the government undertakes a progressive wage policy, that
is, α > 0, β < 1. It is immediately seen from Eqs. (8)-(12) that the eﬀect of
such a policy on the income distribution within each sector and one the overall
income distribution is ambiguous. Such comparisons depend, of course, on the
constraints imposed on α and β as well as on the parameters θˆ1 and θˆ2. This
point will be clariﬁed shortly.
In order to calculate inequality measures directly, one is also interested in
the cumulative income distribution function for each sector. Let
I1 (z) =
zˆ
α
xg1 (x) dx = α+
1
θ1
− {exp [−θ1 (z − α)]}
(
z +
1
θ1
)
− θ1
θ1 + θ2
[exp (−θ2α)][
α+
1
θ1 + θ2
− {exp [− (θ1 + θ2) (z − α)]}
(
z +
1
θ1 + θ2
)] (14)
5
I2 (z) =
zˆ
α
xg2 (x) dx = [exp (−θ2α)]
(
α+
1
θ2
)
− [exp (−θ2z)]
(
z +
1
θ2
)
− θ1
θ1 + θ2
[exp (θ2α)][
exp [− (θ1 + θ2)α]
(
α+
1
θ1 + θ2
)
− {exp [− (θ1 + θ2) z]}
(
z +
1
θ1 + θ2
)]
(15)
Denote by Ii = limz→∞ Ii (z), the total income in sector i. By Eqs. (14)
and (15)
I1 = α+
1
θ1
− θ1
θ1 + θ2
[exp (−θ2α)]
(
α+
1
θ1 + θ2
)
(16)
and
I2 = [exp (−θ2α)]
[
θ1
θ1 + θ2
α+
1
θ2
− θ2
(θ1 + θ2)
2
]
(17)
The Lorenz curve is the cerived relation between Ii(z)/Ii and Gi(z)/Gi(∞).
The eﬀect of a given wage policy, (α, β), on outputs in each sector, Yi, is
calculated as follows. In the private sector incomes are equal to the marginal
products; hence Y2 = I2. In the public sector, the relation between output, a1,
and income is given by Eq. (6). Hence, private total output is
Y1 =
∞ˆ
α
(
z − α
β
)
g1 (z) dz
=
1
β
[
1
θ1
− θ1
(θ1 + θ2)
2 exp (−θ2α)
] (18)
Aggregate output Y is
Y =Y1 + Y2 =
1
βθ1
+ exp (−θ2α)[
θ1
θ1 + θ2
α+
1
θ2
− θ2
(θ1 + θ2)
2 −
θ1
β (θ1 + θ2)
2
] (19)
One can readily calculate that α = 0, β = 1 is a global maximum of Y .2
Some Numerical Examples
For numerical illustration, we shall take arbitrary values, θˆ1 = .02 and θˆ2 = .01.
These values imply that the distribution of abilities is more equal in public
2Simply calculate that at α = 0, β = 1, ∂Y/∂α = ∂Y/∂β = 0, and the second-order
conditions ∂2Y/∂α2 < 0, ∂2Y/∂β2 < 0,
(
∂2Y/∂α2
) (
∂2Y/∂2β
)− (∂2Y/∂α∂β)2 > 0, hold.
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sector employment, relative to private sector employment. This corresponds to
observed facts about distributions of skill and education level in the two sectors.
As already noted, although the density function of abilities is J-shaped for each
sector, the density of income in each looks like the income distributions encoun-
tered in reality (Figure. 1).3 The comparison of alternative wage policies can
be made under alternative assumptions about the restrictions imposed on the
parameters (a, B). The calculations have been carried out under the assump-
tion that. the size of empioyment in the private sector (and hence in the public
sector as well) is constant.
When α = 0, β = 1, using the chosen values for θˆ1 and θˆ2, we have from (9)
lim
z→∞G2 (z) =
θˆ1
θˆ1 + θˆ2
=
2
3
(20)
In general, for any (α, β),
lim
z→∞G2 (z) =
θ1
θ1 + θ2
= exp (−θ2α)
We therefore restrict the parameters (α, β) by the relation
θ1
θ1 + θ2
exp (−θ2α) = 2
3
(21)
which implies that two-thirds of the labor force is employed in the private sector.
From Table 2 and Figure 1 one observes the remarkable eﬀect of changes in
β on income distribution within each sector and on the economy as a whole.
Imposition of a progressive wage schedule, with β = .7 (α = 10.5), reduces
signiﬁcantly (by a factor of three) the upper tail of the income density in the
public sector, and increases, though less dramatically, the inequality in the
private sector. It also seems useful to draw the Lorenz curves for the two
sectors. In both sectors, the curves pertaining to the β = 1 and β = .7 cases
intersect, which implies that an evaluation of alternative policies depends on the
social welfare function one adopts. It is interesting that the overall inequality
as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient increases (from .31 to .32) as β decreases
from 1 to .7.
3For clarity, the vertical axis in Figure 1 is blown up to a factor of 100.
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Table 2:
Income Densities within Each Sector and the Overall
Income Densitya
β = 1 β = .7
z g1 g2 g g1 g2 g
20 .243 .270 .513 .395 .194 .589
40 .296 .369 .665 .406 .381 .787
60 .272 383 .665 .314 .415 .729
80 .222 .358 .581 .216 .387 .604
100 .171 .318 .489 .141 .339 .479
120 .127 .273 .401 .081 .288 .375
140 .092 .231 .323 .053 .240 .294
160 .065 .193 .259 .032 .199 .231
180 .045 .160 .206 .019 .164 .183
200 .032 .132 .164 .011 .135 .146
a One-third of the labor force is in the public sector.
Figure 1: Two graphs show the cumulative proportion of income recipients: (a)
is the public sector, (b) is the private sector
The eﬀects of wage policies in the public sector on the size of real outputs
are presented in Table 3 . As β decreases from unity to .5, the output of the
public sector decreases by about 18%, whereas the output of the private sector
increases by about 3.5%. Total output decreases, however, by merely l%.
The above results clearly depend on the constraint that the allocation of
the labor force between the sectors remains constant. An alternative constreint
would be to ﬁx the level of output in one of the sectors, or the ratio between the
outputs of the two sectors. The results pertaining to these alternative assump-
tions are as expected. When the size of the output of the public sector is ﬁxed,
then a progressive (β < 1) wage policy in the public sector has a remarkable
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negative eﬀect on the output of the private sector, reﬂecting the increased pro-
portion of the labor force allocated to the public sector, needed to maintain its
output. In all cases, total output decreases (depending on the type of constraint
imposed, in some cases very signiﬁcantly), income inequality decreases in the
public sector and increases in the private sector, whereas the overall eﬀect on
income distribution is ambiguous.
The next natural step in the analysis is to ﬁnd the socially optimum wage
policy, that is, a wage policy that maximizes, say, a utilitarian social welfare
function W ,
max
α,b
W =
∞ˆ
0
u (z) g (z) dz (22)
However, the constraints of the problem are not obvious. The government
may choose wage schedules that satisfy the constraint that the vaiue of the
public sector's output is euqal to the total incomes ofthose employed in this
sector (assuming that the government's output is sold),
∞ˆ
0
zg (z) =
∞ˆ
0
(
z − α
β
)
g (z) dz
or
α = (1− β) I1/G1 (23)
where G1 = limz→∞G1 (z).
If the government has available tax-subsidy instruments then the anaiysis
becomes more complicated since the optimum wage policy will depend on the
nature of these instruments (such as, for example, income taxation) and the
issue of the optimum mix of wage and tax policies arises. These issues are not
anayzed in this paper.
Table 3:
Output in the Public and Private Sectors
and Total Output
β Y1 Y2 Y
1.0 27.8 88.9 116.7
.9 27.0 89.6 116.6
.8 26.2 90.3 116.5
.7 25.3 91.0 116.3
.6 24.4 91.6 115.9
.5 23.3 92.1 115.5
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Figure 2: Two graphs show the cumulative proportion of income recipients: (a)
is the piblic sector, (b) is the private sector
Reservation and Possible Generalizations
We have examined the eﬀects of wage policies in the public sector on the sectoral
distribution of the labor force and on incomes. Although the underlying model
has been extremely simple, it seems to yield quite realistic conclusions. However,
the assumptions are too simple to provide a framework for certain important
issues, three of which are discussed here.
First, one expects a positive correlation between individual aptitudes in dif-
ferent occupations. We have assumed in our examples that aptitudes are dis-
tributed independently. It would he interesting to study the eﬀects of wage
policies for varying degrees of correlation between aptitudes.
Second, the underlying production functions have been overly simpliﬁed. In
particular, marginal products a1 and a2 are independent of the allocation of the
labor force. More generally, one should explore the interaction of employment
in the public sector on marginal productivity in the private sector, end vice
versa. More speciﬁcally, suppose that total output Y is a function of two types
of employments: public L1 and private L2: Y = F (L1, L2). Now, suppose
Li =
∞ˆ
0
aiXi (ai) dai
where Xi (ai) is the number of laborers in section i with aptitude ai. The
function Xi (ai) is determined by individual maximization as in the basic model.
Competition in the private sector implies that w1 (a1) = a1F1 (L1, L2), whereas
w2 = w2 (a2) is a choice function. Clearly, in analyzing this model, terms such
as F12 = ∂
2Y/∂L1∂L2, that is, complementarity or substitution between public
and private employment, will be crucial.
Finally, it has been assumed throughout that the government (planner), as
well as private employers, can identify the true aptitude of each individual.
This is a rather extreme assumption, particularly when it concerns the public
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sector. One could, however, modify the model to include imperfect information.
Houthakker (1974), for example, has postulated that the probability that an
individual with aptitudes (a1, a2) will work in. sector i, P_i , is given by
Pi =
exp (kai)
exp (ka1) + exp (ka2)
Clearly, when k = 0, all sectors have an equal probability of being chosen,
whereas k →∞ is the case just analyzed.
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